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THE TAX-FREE SALE OF A BUSINESS:
Reorganizations, Spin-Offs, and Other Feats of Magic
Under the 1954 Code
By ROBERT O. SWADOS*
If the Cabots speak only to God, writers on tax reorganization, more often
than not, speak only to each other. The complexity of their discourse is under-
standable, since nowhere in the tax field is there such a forbidding mixture of
financial concepts, delicate stockholder-creditor relationships, and technical cor-
porate statutes. The necessity of rigid adherence to the tax provisions on the one
hand, and the corporate statutes on the other, require an attention to form in
draftsmanship much greater than any branch of the law since the art of the
conveyancer became the routine of the junior clerk. Yet the tax reorganization
is a useful, practical tool, not only for the large transactions which fill the pages
of the Wall Street Journal, but in the acquisition, sale and adjustment of relation-
ships in small business as well. In the face of the complexity of the subject
matter, I shall strive mightily to make my analysis understandable at least by a
broader audience than the excellent gentlemen who write other papers in this
field.
It is a traditional point of departure in discussing tax reorganizations (and
a favorite argument of revenue agents) to emphasize that what we are discussing,
though the substantial number of pages that follow, is an exception. Gain-(we
needn't be bothered much with loss in this discussion)-is ordinarily recognized
and taxed. Congress has provided an exception where there is a readjustment in
the corporate or capital structure, and some or all of the original owners and
some or all of the original businesses are continuing in the reorganized corporate
arrangement. A transaction which qualifies as a "reorganization" under the federal
tax laws is frequently referred to as "tax free" (and will be so here); it is more
correct to describe it as a deferment of gain (or loss) until the new shares of
stock received in the reorganization are sold.
To illustrate some of the basic principles and tools which we must handle in
this field, let us take as an example one which all of us-accountants, lawyers,
internal revenue agents, and innocent bystanders-would agree is a "reorgan-
ization":
Your client's company (he owns 100 per cent of the single class of capital
*Member of the New York Bar and the faculty of the Law School.
This paper is based upon the writer's lecture at the 2nd Annual Institute on
Taxation, Millard Fillmore College of the University of Buffalo.
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stock) was originally organized in a town in northern Pennsylvania. As sales
improved, a new plant was established in Buffalo, N. Y., the administrative offices
were moved here, and substantially all the sales and manufacture now take place
in the State of New York. The corporation had to qualify to do business in the
Stare *of New York, and there is no longer any particular advantage in main-
taining the Pennsylvania corporate "domicile," especially in view of some of the
irksome local taxes and reporting requirements with which Pennsylvania saddles
Pennsylvania corporations.1 The obvious answer is to shed the Pennsylvania
domicile, change the company to a New York corporation, and terminate the
Pennsylvania connection. There are various ways in which this could be done,
perhaps by organizing a New York corporation and merging it with the Pennsyl-
vania company; you could do it by organizing the New York company, transferring
the assets from the Pennsylvania company to the New York corporation, turning
in the client's shares of stock in Pennsylvania for the stock in New York, and
liquidating the Pennsylvania company. The mechanics of the transaction could
be arranged so that the reincorporation in the new state satisfied Type A, Type B,
or Type C of the listed authorized types of reorganization in section 368 (a) (1)
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. But, whatever the mechanics, we have the
basic characteristics of a true reorganization: The business is the same, the stock-
holders are the same, their relative rights and interests are the same. The only
adjustment is in the state of incorporation, and there is a business reason for the
change.
Yet what I call the modern "alchemy" has made this relatively simple change
hardly recognizable, as more complex transactions earn the label "reorganization."
I am sure that you all remember the stories of the alchemists of the middle ages,
who were engaged in the midnight-after-midnight search for the philosopher's
stone that would change the basest metal to pure gold. A tax planner is engaged
in a somewhat similar search in his attempt to change the higher-taxed ordinary
income into lower-taxed capital gains. In defending itself against this relentless
pursuit, Congress, with the aid (or opposition) of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, has at times had to recognize as non-taxable or tax-deferred corporate
adjustments which seemed to depart considerably from our simple reincorporation
example. And while the general concept of a reorganization under the tax laws
is a continuation of the corporate business in different form, the statute has
specific definitions (§ 368) which, in the light of the history of the Internal
Revenue Code and the hostility of courts and Commissioner to the use of the
reorganization sections to make taxable income "disappear," must be strictly
followed as to form, language and substance.
1. For example, the 3% sales tax adopted March 6, 1956. See Wall Street
Journal, March 13, 1956.
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Unlike the tax problems of the winner on a television "quiz" program,
reorganizations do not arise by accident. They come about as a result of deliber-
ately planned transactions.2 While the moves prescribed may appear to be some-
what like a game of chess, it is not the ordinary game of chess of which I am
reminded, but the strange pursuit of the Men of Mars in one of the old novels
of Edgar Rice Burroughs.3 There, on Mars, the rulers played chess with real
men, armed with shield and sword; and if you were a pawn or a knight and made
the wrong move, off went your head! Taking what little solace we can from the
knowledge that it may not be we, but our clients, who may be decapitated, let
us consider the statute.
THE FACTS
The scene, the dramatis personae and the mood are as follows:
Ack Corporation, with net assets of $100,000, is engaged in the
machine tool business and desires to acquire Transit Company, which
operates foundries and has gross assets of $100,000, liabilities of
$50,000.
Ack Corporation has 100 shares outstanding, all held by one stock-
holder, X. Transit also has 100 shares outstanding, held 70 by stockholder
A who is active in the business, 30 by stockholder B, who is a mere
investor.
A merger is proposed under which shareholders of both companies
would surrender their shares to a new corporation called Rack Corpora-
tion, with 150 shares of Rack common stock issued as follows:
To Ack shareholders, 1 for 1, or 100 shares;
To former stockholders of Transit company, 1 share in the new
corporation Rack, for each 2 shares of Transit surrendered,
or 50 shares.
(The ratio is worked out on the basis of the book value of the assets-
the Ack assets have a net value of $100,000; the net worth of Transit per
books being $50,000; but of course other bases for the ratio of the
exchange of stock could be used-earnings, values, appraised values of
property, dividends, if any, etc.). Under the ratio of 2 Transit shares for
1 in Rack, stockholder A would receive 35 shares in the reorganized
company, stockholder B, 15 shares.
2. Of course they may be "involuntary," as in SEC or FCC directed ex-
changes, or in insolvency reorganizations (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 371, 1071,
1081). (Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this paper are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.).
3. (The "Tarzan" creator).
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Included in the assets of Transit which would go to the new com-
pany in the merger is the "Surplus Building," situated at the intersection
of Boot and Gain Streets, which has been used by Transit in its foundry
business, but probably will not be required when the facilities of the
merged company are available.4
Now, as often happens, A and B do not see eye-to-eye on this
transaction. A looks forward to the merger, wishes to remain active in
the business, and would not want to sell his stock anyway, since he paid
very little for it many years ago and would realize a substantial capital
gain with the resulting tax. B has no confidence in the machine tool
business, doesn't like X, and would gladly get out, at the sight of an
appropriate amount of money for his stock.
How do we arrange the transaction so as to satisfy X, A, B, and the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue?
I
WHAT IS A "REORGANIZATION"?
We have discussed the general concept of a "reorganization," but it must be
emphasized that only the specific types of reorganization transactions described
in section 368 (a) (1) will find ready acceptance by the Treasury. The following
are the types of reorganization which are applicable to the problem we are
considering at this stage of the discussion: 5
Type A-A statutory merger or consolidation.
Type B-Stock for stock - the acquiring corporation (Ack) gets
"control" (80%) of the transferring corporation (Transit) by
issuing its own stock to the shareholders of the corporation being
acquired.
Type C-Stock for assets-the acquiring corporation gets substantially
all of the properties of the transferring corporation by issuing Ack
voting stock to the transferring corporation, for distribution to
Transit shareholders.
4. For the significance of this, see Section VIII of this analysis on "spin-offs."
5. Type F (§ 368 (a) (1) (f) )is really our Pennsylvania-New York rein-
corporation. For Type D, which has little application except In corporate separa-
tions, see Part VII, infra. Because of the application of section 356 of the Code,
dealing with "boot," problems similar to those encompassed In a Type E "re-
capitalization" are discussed wherever securities are exchanged In our reorganiza-
tion; but out of self-limitation, this paper does not deal with recapitalizations
specifically. (See Friedman & Silbert, Recapitalizations, N. Y. U. 13TH INST. ON
FED. TAx 533).
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Types B and C are sometimes called non-statutory or "practical" mergers.
Despite the voluminous reports on adoption of the 1954 Code, the Treasury's
work of interpretation goes slowly, and the "final" Treasury Regulations have just
emerged.6 These regulations insist that a transaction must fit "specifically" within
one of the definitions in section 368 (a) (1) (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (c) )
to qualify as a 'reorganization. Decisions under the 1939 Code and the history of
the reorganization sections of the taxing acts suggest, however, that transactions
which are the same in substance or have the same "net effect" as those specifically
defined may qualify.7 (See Merritt, Tax Free Corporate Acquisitions-The Law
aid the Proposed Regulations, 53 MICH. L. REv. 914 (1955).
II
WHY A "REORGANIZATION"?
We have already begun to consider at least two purposes of the reorganiza-
tion transaction - (1) to change the state of incorporation so as to avoid onerous
local taxes or obtain the advantage of the corporate statutes of another state which
are more liberal; (2) to permit purchase of the corporate business without sub-
jecting the selling shareholders to substantial dividend or capital gains taxes. Of
course there other purposes, such as (a) to rearrange the capital and debt struc-
ture of a corporation in financial difficulties so as to give creditors equity stock in
exchange for their debt claims and subordinate common stockholders; (b) to
combine corporate businesses to promote sales, provide diversification of products,
increase financing possibilities; (c) to separate corporate businesses so as to reduce
liability of profitable for unprofitable divisions, reduce state income taxes, facilitate
ultimate sale of part of the corporate business and divide the continuing business
among stockholders. There are also possible tax "side effects" of reorganizations
which should not be-but sometimes are - a principal motivation:
(1) in corporate combinations: continuation of high basis for assets acquired,
carryovers of losses and credits facilitated under section 381 (except in Type
D reorganizations); and spin-offs facilitated (by acquiring an active trade or
business);
(2) in corporate separations: the additional $25,000 surtax exemption, reduction
6. The Treasury issued its "final" regulations on corporate distributions
and adjustments (T.D. 6152, 20 F. R. 8875, Dec. 3, 1955; I. R. B. 1955-50, Dec.
12, 1955; 1956 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 143 ft.) almost one year after notice
of the proposed regulations was filed with the Federal Register. (19 F. R. 8237,
Dec. 11, 1954).
7. The Treasury at times urges this itself. See, e. g., peD4Zp Spring's Distilling
Co., 23 T. C. 196 (1954).
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in rate of tax, and the additional $60,000 exemption from the tax on unreas-
onable accumulation of earnings ($60,000 exemption from section 531
(old § 102) ).
If these tax side effects are a principal motivation, the Commissioner is not
without weapons to defeat the reorganization. In addition to the possibility of
invoking the "business purpose" rule (see Part II-C), he has the power to allocate
income and deductions under section 482 (old § 45), the power to place on the
taxpayer the burden of supporting the argument that the separation does not have
as a principal business purpose the availability of the additional surtax or accumu-
lations exemption (section 1551, old § 15 (c) ), and, finally, at least where the
tax benefit is acquired from the "selling' corporation, the possibility of charging
that the tax avoidance purpose requires the disallowance of the deduction or the
high basis (section 269, old § 129).
THE RULES OF THE GAME
In analyzing any reorganization problem, there are certain fundamental meth-
ods of approach and certain not-so-fundamental provisions of the Code and court
interpretations which cut across all of the types of reorganization transactions.
A. First of all, it is important to distinguish between
(1) the tax consequences to the corporations involved in the "reorganiza-
tion;' and
(2) the tax effect on the stockholders who may receive stock or securities
or other property as a result of the reorganization.8
B. As to property received by the shareholders, distinguish between '
(1) voting common stock which may be received tax free;
(2) cash, which always has a tax consequence, either as a capital gain,
reduction in basis or as a dividend (ordinary income);
8. For example, we look to see whether the transaction between the corpora-
tions Is a "reorganization" under section 368 (a) (1), tax free under section 361;
then to section 354 to see the tax consequence of the exchange Qf !hare and
other property by the shareholders.
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(3) "securities" (e.g., long-term bonds) which may be exchanged tax free
for other "securities,' but in most reorganization transactions under the
new Code, where no securities are surrendered, may also be treated as
the equivalent of cash-producing capital gain or ordinary income
(§ 354 (a) (2); § 356 (d) (2) (c));
(4) assumption of a liability, which in some reorganizations is ignored
(§ 368 (a) (1) (c) ), but in a7Type D reorganization where the
liability exceeds basis is treated as the equivalent of cash (§ 357 (c));
and finally
(5) preferred stock, the receipt of which, like voting common stock, may
in an "A" type reorganization be treated as non-taxable and produce
no immediate tax, but may give rise to ordinary income on sale or
redemption (see § 306).
Where cash, property, or securities are received by a shareholder in addition
to the shares of stock which may be- received tax free, the jargon calls
it "boot".
C. The following "judge-made" rules, while not specifically dealt with in
the Code or committee reports, are still important factors in analyz-
ing any reorganization problem:
1. The house that Gregory built (Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465
(1935)) ;9 the transaction must have a bona fide corporate business
purpose (see U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (c)).
2. The "squeeze-box" principle--"step transactions": the Commissioner
and the courts may consider and telescope a series of transactions (such
as a spin-off, followed by a liquidation) as part of one plan, if close
together in time, or if legally or logically dependint upon one another,
in determining whether the transactions qualify or do not qualify for
non-recognition.
9. Mrs. Gregory caused her holding company, which owned all of the
shares of X corporation, to transfer the X shares to Y company, and issue the
Y shares to her. Six days later, she liquidated Y company, and reported the
difference between the value of the X shares received on the liquidation and
her allocated basis as capital gain. The result: for Mrs. Gregory, under the
Supreme Court's decision, Instead of capital gain a substantial dividend tax,
which her counsel conceded the transactions were intended to avoid; for taxpay-
ers generally, the "spin-off" route was blocked for 15 years. (Sge FAart VIII infra),
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
3. The umbilical cord, or "continuity of interest" requirement - the
original owners of the equity must continue (to a variable extent,
depending upon the type of reorganization) as owners of the equity in
the reorganized corporate enterprise. 10 (This has been modified to
some extent in the 1954 Code - see §§ 368 (a) (1) (D) and
355 (a) (2) (A) ).
D. Certain mechanics must be followed:
(1) There must be a "plan" of reorganization" which should, but need
nor, be in writing (Walter S. Heller, 2 T. C. 371 (1943); James G.
MAurrin, 24 T. C.-No. 57 (1955) ), and under the regulations must
be adopted by the board of directors of each corporation involved
(U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3);
(2) the stock or securities received in an exchange which is a step in
the reorganization must be those issued by "a party to the reorganiza-
tion" (§ 354 (a) (1) )12
E. A key word is "control", defined in § 368 c).
"Control" which must be acquired in a Type B, or which must exist in a
Type D reorganization, means 80% of the total combined voting power of all
classes of voting stock plus 80% of the total number of all other shares. That does
not mean that you need to acquire 80% of each class of voting stock; but if, as
under the law of Illinois,13 preferred shares have voting rights, the votes of the
preferred must be added to the votes of the common to determine whether the
requisite 80% has been obtained.
F. It should also be remembered that the reorganization avenue is not
a one-way street, although the Treasury may sometimes seem able to change the
10. The Treasury purports to require a continuity of the "business enter-
prise" (assets) as well as a continuity of the business owners (U. S. Treas. Reg.§ 1.368-1 (b) ). Compare Scofield v. San Antonio Transit Co., 219 F. 2d 149 (5th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied 350 U. S. 823 (1955), with Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
189 F. 2d 382 (5th Cir. 1951) and Becher, 22 T. C. 932 (1954). The new regulations
recognize, however, that section 338 (a) (1) (D) creates an exception to the
continuity-of-persons requirement, and that the rule may be satisfied If the
participants in the reorganized enterprise were "indirectly" owners prior to the
reorganization.
11. Exception: Spin-offs, etc., under section 355.
12. In a Type C reorganization the securities issued by the parent having
80% or more control of the acquiring corporation may be used: § 368 (b), In-
tended to abrogate or modify the Groman (302 U. S. 82 (1937) and Bashford(302 U. S. 454 (1938) ) cases; § 368 (a) () (C).
13. People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707 (1922).
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color of the signals at-will. It-may be to the advantage of the "revenuer" to assert
that what appears to be a sale is in fact a tax-free reorganization; and he has done
so effectively, to deny an operating loss deduction on the sale of assets, to subject
a cash distribution on an exchange to dividend tax instead of capital gain, and to
deny a "stepped-up" basis to an acquiring corporation.14
G. It will usually be possible to obtain the written views of the Treasury
in advance. But it may come as something of a shock to the practitioner who is
not inured to the curious trade practices of the tax field that even a solemn specific
ruling by the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Tax
Rulings Division, that a proposed transaction is a tax-free reorganization may be
little more than a temporary precedent. To the anxious practitioner who is con-
cerned about the foundation of his proposed corporate acquisition, the ruling may
make the foundation look secure; but quicksand it may nevertheless turn out to
be. Unless the statute of limitations is applicable, the Commissioner is not pre-
vented from changing his views nine years later, taxing the very transaction and
the very taxpayer involved in the ruling on a basis the same as or different from
that considered in the precious letter in tax counsel's files.15
IV
MERGER
(TYPE A)
The first type of reorganization set out in § 368 (a) (1), and the first type
approved by Congress as well, historically, is the statutory merger or consolidation.
In New York, Ack and Transit could use section 85 of the Stock Corporation Law
(the "merger" statute in New York) or section 86, the "consolidation" statute.
Section 85 is really 'a liquidation of a subsidiary. Section 86 is what is known in
most states as a "merger". 16
14. Pebble Springs Distilling Co., 23 T. C. No. 29 (Oct. 29, 1955); iAddon v.
Comoissioner,--F. 2d- (6th Cir. 1956), P-H 1956 FED. TAx SERv. 72429; Becher
v. Commissioner, 22 T. C. No. 112 (1954), aff'd 221 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); (P-H
1955 FED. TAX SERV. 172574; Transport Products Corp., 25 T. C. No. 97 (Jan. 24,
1956); Stockton Harbor Industrial Ca. vs. Commissioner, 216 F. 2d 638 (9th Cir.
1954)
15. Avco Manufacturing Corp., 25 T. C. No. 111 (1956). Of course, if the
initial case reaches audit, a closing agreement as to liability (§ 7121) may be
possible, or the modified estoppel of §§ 1311 ff. ( 1939 CODE § 3801) may operate
to repair some of the damage.
16.- Compare DEL. CORPORATION LAW § 251 ("consolidation or merger"), § 253
("merger of parent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary").
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A. Tax consequences of the statutory merger or consolidation.
(1) Whether the shares in Rack are distributed first to Transit and then dis-
tributed directly by Rack to the former shareholders of Transit, no gain or
loss would be recognized to any of the corporations (§ 361 (a) ).
(2) Under section 354 (a) no gain or loss would be recognized to any of
the shareholders of Ack Corporation or of Transit Company. We may
assume that all of the assets of both Transit and Ack are transferred to
Rack and all of the shares of stock in Rack received are distributed to the
shareholders of each of the original companies, since this follows as a matter
of law under sections 85 and 86 of the Stock Corporation Law.17
(3) The consolidated company would have the same basis with respect to assets
received as the companies participating in the merger, and the shareholders
would substitute for the Rack shares received their respective cost bases
for shares surrendered in exchange.' 8
B. Suppose stockholder B - the investor - wants out with cash or other
"boot" - presumably $15,000?
That would not destroy the tax-free character of the reorganization as to
stockholder A, since A's continuity of interest (70% in the Transit Company
assets forming part of the reorganized company) is probably sufficient.1" But B
will owe a capital gains tax on the difference between his cost and the cash received.
C. Could stockholder B receive, tax-free "securities" (such as long-term
bonds) instead of voting stock in the reorganized company? No. Under sections
354 (a) (2) and 356 (d), since stockholder B would be surrendering no "se-
curities", the principal amount of the bonds received by him would be treated as
cash received and subject him to capital gains tax. In Bazley v. Commissioner,
331 U. S. 737 (1947) the Supreme Court held on the facts there presented that an
exchange of stock for new stock and long-term debentures (literally a recapitaliz-
17. Subdivision (9) of section 86 requires the certificate of consolidation to
specify "the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corpora-
tions ... into shares or other securities of the consolidated corporation"; and
section 89 states that: "upon the filing of such certificate of consolidation.. . all
the rights, privileges, franchises and interests of each of the constituent corpora-
tions, and all the property, real, personal and mixed .. . [etc.] ...shall be
taken and deemed to be transferred to and vested in such consolidated corpora-
tion, without further act or deed". Thus a partial "reorganization", or Type D,
cannot be accomplished through sections 85 or 86 of the New York Stock Corp-
oration Law.
18. Sections 363, 358.
19. Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 382 (5th Cir. 1951) ---69;--
James G. Murrin, 24 T. C. No. 57 (1955)-72%.
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ation type of reorganization) resulted in the taxation of the value of the debentures
to the receiving stockholder. Section 356 (d) takes the result in the Bazley case
and makes it a general rule of law.
D. Could stockholders A and B be given part stock and part cash or part
stock and part securities? Yes, but capital gain would be recognized to the extent
of the cash or securities received ("boot"). Also, watch this further risk in section
356: If Transit Company has accumulated earnings and profits, and the distribu-
tion of cash or securities is pro rata or otherwise "has the effect" of the. distribu-
tion of a dividend, the cash or securities may be ordinary income to stockholders
A and B (§ 356 (a) (2); Commissioner v. Bedford's Estate, 325 U. S. 283
(1945).
Would it make any difference if A and B were given preferred stock in
Rack in addition to the voting stock? Here the danger would be in section 306
-the "hot" preferred stock section, which makes any preferred stock dividend
potential ordinary income on a subsequent sale or redemption. If the preferred
stock is distributed pro rata to the former shareholders of Transit, the distribution
may be a transaction substantially equivalent to a dividend, and, on subsequent
sale or redemption, under section 306 (c) (1) (B), both A and B may be taxed
on the amount received as ordinary income to the extent it would have been a
dividend if received in cash on the original issuance of the preferred stock (§ 306
(a) (1) (A)-ii).
E. Advantages of merger. As we shall see, the other avenues of reorganiza-
tion generally restrict the means of "purchase" to voting common stock in the
acquiring or successor corporation. A merger permits more flexibility in the choice
of distribution to the "selling" shareholders-voting stock, preferred stock, cash
or securities - and strengthens the possible use of carryovers under Section 381,
and the continuance of high basis of assets on the books of the transferor. More-
over, a merger may be possible (subject to the requirements of corporate law and
the "continuity of interest" rule) without obtaining 80% control of the trans-
feror company. For example, New York Stock Corporation Law section 86 requires
only 2/3 of the shareholders in the selling corporation to vote in favor of the
merger.
F. In that case, why not always use a merger?
Some of the disadvantages and difficulties:
1. Some states have no merger statutes; some states (like Minnesota 20 )
20. At least until 1951 (MINN. REV. STAT., § 301.41, as amended by L. 1951,
c. 98, § 8).
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do not permit merger of domestic and "foreign" (out-of-state) corporations. Even
section 91 of the New York Stock Corporation Law permits the consolidation of
a domestic with a foreign stock corporation only "if the laws of such other state
or states so permit."
2. The New York merger statute (Stock Corporation Law, § 85), which
is the simplest procedure, would require Ack first to acquire 959 ownership of
Transit, and requires that the transferring company be "authorized to engage in
business similar or incidental" to the acquiring corporation (§ 85 (1) ).
3. While the consolidation statute, section 86 of the New York Stock Corp-
oration Law, permits a consolidation on the vote of the holders of 2/3 of the
voting shares in each corporation, under both consolidation (§ 87) and merger
(§ 85-7) dissenting stockholders have the power to demand an appraisal and
payment for their shares; and if stockholder B did not agree with the 2-to-1 ratio
proposed, or otherwise refused to go along in the plan of reorganization, he could
subject the consolidated company and Transit to a substantial cash liability.
G. Immediate sale. Could stockholders A and B forthwith sell the shares in
Rack received on the exchange? Not if it could be demonstrated that their sale
was contemplated as part of, or necessary to, the original plan. Under the "step
transaction" rule, if the sale were part of the plan, the tax-free character of the
reorganization might be destroyed, resulting in tax to the Ack stockholders
as well.21
V
TYPE B - STOCK FOR STOCK
Suppose that a statutory merger or consolidation is not practicable. Ack
Corporation might attempt an acquisition for voting stock under subdivision B
of Section 368 (a) (1).
A. The requisites are:
(1) "Solely" voting stock, neither cash nor preferred stock nor securities, may
be used in the acquisition.
21. See Ralph M. Heintz, 25 T. C. No. 21 (Oct. 27, 1955), in which an alleged
commitment by the acquiring corporation to facilitate resale of the preferred
stock received on the exchange was used successfully by Jack & Heintz to obtain
capital gains treatment and to defeat the Treasury's claim that the use of a
statutory merger resulted in a tax-free reorganization, plus dividend "boot".
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(2) Ack Corporation must end up with "control" (see IH-E above) - 80%
of the voting stock of Transit, immediately after the acquisition.
You can see the immediate difficulty. Stockholder B, the mere investor, may
object and demand cash, bonds or preferred; since he owns 30% of Transit, he
blocks the reorganization.
B. Could stockholder B be given his 30% interest in Transit partly in
stock, to give the 80% control, the balance in cash? It is questionable if this
could be done in "one transaction" under the regulations (U. S. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-2 (c) ), because the cash and stock consideration flowing to stockholder
B are concurrent.22
C. If A owned 80%, could you give Ack common stock to A and cash to
B? While the regulations do not make this distinction, the continuity of interest
is probably sufficient and the transaction may qualify as a Type B reorganization.
It is preferable to make an individual deal with B, separate in time and plan from
the reorganization (cf. William Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930) ). Of course this
would raise a practical as well as a legal problem. Some duty might rest upon
management to be fair and make the same offer available to all shareholders.
Suppose Transit had numerous stockholders. How does one make sure that the
right number of stockholders agree to take stock?
D. "Creeping" control. Suppose Ack Corporation bought B's Transit stock
for cash in 1955 and acquired A's remaining 70% for Ack's voting common
stock in 1956? The 1954 Code intended to provide some relief here, contrary to
Pulfer, 43 B.TA. 677 (1941) which held that you have to acquire the 80%
control for stock at one time in one transaction. The legislative history indicates
that clause B was amended in the 1954 Code to remove any "doubt as to whether
the existing statute permits such an acquisition tax free when the acquiring corp-
oration already owns some of the voting stock of the other corporation", even if
the acquisition is "in a single transaction or in a series of transactions taking
22. Thus unlike a Type A merger, the use of "boot" (whether cash, pre-
ferred stock or other property) subjects the gain in the entire amount realized-
boot plus stock-to tax. In Hubert B. Howard, 24 T. C. No. 90 (July 9, 1955)(discussed in 3 J. TAXATION 363 (1955) ), the court held, under the 1939 Code,
that acquisition of 80.19% of the transferring corporation's stock for voting
stock, at the same time that the balance of the stock was acquired for cash,
apparently from unrelated stockholders, was not an exchange "solely" of voting
stock for 80% control and did not qualify as a reorganization. It will be observed,
however, that in the Howard case the principal executive of the transferring
company acted as agent for all of the stockholders, both those who received only
stock and those who received only cash, and, that in at least one case one of
the stockholders (a charitable institution) received both cash and stock. See
also Rev. Rul. 396, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 147.
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place over a relatively short period of time such as 12 months".23 However, the
Treasury takes the position that if (applying the step transaction rule) the cash
and stock acquisition can be treated as "one transaction," the plan is disqualified.
(U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (c) ). The regulation appears to be inconsistent
with the Committee Reports; but the example in the Committee Report (adopted
in the regulations) does separate the cash and stock acquisitions by 16 years!
Compare 68 HARV. L. REV. 416 (1955); Darrell, Corporate Organizations and
Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 32 TAXES 1013
(1954) .24
E. Corporate procedures. The regulations require each corporation to adopt
the plan of reorganization, 25 even though only the stockholders of Transit are
involved. Presumably this means resolutions of the Board of Directors of each
corporation, and action at a stockholders' meeting of Ack would not be required.
If Ack has treasury stock (stock which was originaly issued and repurchased or
surrendered) sufficient to carry out the transaction with A and B, that treasury
stock may of course be used. If there is no "treasury" stock, as I have defined it,
but merely authorized and unissued shares, care must be taken to be sure that
the unissued stock is not subject to preemptive rights. Under section 39 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law, subdivision 4, the shares would not be subject
to preemptive rights if they "are issued or optioned by the board of directors to
effect a merger or consolidation, or for a consideration other than cash". If there is
no treasury stock, or no authorized but unissued shares, Ack's certificate of incor-
poration must be amended to increase its capital stock, requiring the consent of
a majority of the shareholders.26 (That would be no problem here, since X is
the sole stockholder in Adc Corporation). Should a merger be desired after Ack
gains the requisite 809 control of Transit, section 85 or section 86 of the Stock
Corporation Law and section 332 of the Code must be followed to effect a liqui-
dation of Transit, now a subsidiary2'
23. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 273 (1954); Prentice-Hall reprint,
p. 24314.
24. See the further discussion in part VI-C, infra, of buying out minority In-
terests in order to qualify the transaction as a reorganization.
25. U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3:
26. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAV § 37; DEL. CORPORATION LAw § 242.
27. In that liquidation, since the subsidiary was acquired for stock In a
non-taxable reorganization, section 334 (b) (2) (the Kimbel-Diamond rule, per-
mitting the use of a new basis for the assets acquired) will not apply.
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TYPE C - STOCK FOR ASSETS
Suppose that Transit Company has contingent liabilities, or for other reasons
Ack Corporation does not wish to acquire Transit stock, with the resulting inheri-
tance of Transits corporate troubles. The Type C reorganization may be indicated.
A. The general rule is that Transit must transfer "substantially all" of its
properties, in exchange solely for Ack's voting stock. This plan has certain possible
advantages over Type B:
1. Could Ack Corporation, in addition to giving voting stock, assume or
take subject to Transits $50,000 liabilities? Yes - if the only other consideration
is voting stock. But the Commissioner may argue in some cases that the size of
the liability assumed, its ratio to total assets transferred, means the transaction is
really a purchase, not a reorganization (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.362-2(d) (1) ).
2. Ack Corporation could give Transit stock for 80% (by market value)
of its assets, cash for the balance (0 368 (a) (2) (B) ), and the cash then
could be distributed to stockholder B, with A receiving all stock, tax free
(§ 354 (a) ).
3. However, Ack Corporation could not give cash and assume Transits
liabilities, since "other property" may be given for no more than 20% of the
value of Transit's gross assets, and for this purpose you count as "other property"
liabilities assumed or to which property acquired is subject. (§ 368 (a) (2)
(B) ). No gain is realized by the Transit Corporation if it distributes the cash
(§ 361 (b) )2
4. Ack Corporation may under the new Code transfer a part or all of the
assets received to a new subsidiary (§ 368 (a) (2) (C) ).
5. If Ack were in fact owned by another corporation having 80% control,
Ack could use the parent's voting stock instead of Ack using its own (0 368
(a) (1) (C) ) - but, under the Treasury's interpretation, not part stock of the
parent and part subsidiary stock (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (d) (1) ).
B. Corporate procedures. Here, as in the case of the stock-for-stock reorgan-
ization, corporate law would probably require appropriate resolutions of the board
28. Note that if Transit's liabilities were only $10,000, Ack Corporation
could give stock for the properties, assume the debts, and also give cash up to
$10,000 (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (d) (3) ).
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of directors of Ack; but since the transaction may for non-tax purposes be a sale
of Transit's assets, consent of two thirds of Transit's stockholders would be re-
quired; and objecting stockholders have the right to demand appraisal of and
payment for their shares (N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAw §§ 20, 21). But
since the stock of Ack would now be held in Transit, liquidation or dissolution
proceedings should then follow to hand the Ack shares over to Transit share-
holders, under New York Stock Corporation Law section 105, and New York
General Corporation Law section 29, the exchange of Transit for Ack shares being
tax free under section 354 (a) of the Code.29
C. Buying out B first; disposition of minority interests.
Suppose B objects? His right of appraisal as the owner of 30% of the
Transit stock may as a practical matter block the reorganization. If he owned
more than one-third of the outstanding shares, he would have the legal power to
do so.80 Can A arrange the redemption of B's shares first, then consummate the
reorganization? If there is no gap in time, there is some danger that the Commis-
sioner would treat the consideration to B as flowing from Ack corporation, and
the exchange would not be "solely" for voting stock.
Of the many areas in the reorganization field where neither the regulations
nor the decisions provide adequate clarification, one which is of great practical
inportance is the extent and methods by which minority interests can be elimin-
ated as preliminary to or in connection with the reorganization plan. The de-
cisions tell us that "it is almost a universal experience that some nonassenting
stock must be acquired otherwise than through the mechanics of the consolidation
plan,' and that such preliminary acquisition need not destroy the tax-free charac-
ter of the reorganization. 31 Indeed, section 302 of the 1954 Code, with its mathe-
matical criteria for distinguishing between a redemption equivalent to a dividend
and a buy-out which results in capital gain, would seem to facilitate these prelim-
inary transactions.32 Yet in the stock-for-stock (Type B) reorganization, cases
such as Hubert E. Howard3 3 suggests that even if A held 80% of the stock of
29. Suppose, because of the use of cash or other boot that comes close to
the 20% limit, the transaction between Transit and Ack is ultimately determined
to be taxable. While the result may seem far fetched, there Is a danger that
the profit on the sale may be taxed twice-to Transit Company on the exchange
and to Transit shareholders on the liquidation. Caution may therefore require
the adoption of a "plan of liquidation" under Code section 337 before the re-
organization agreement is executed.
30. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAv § § 20, 21.
31. Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1936), a Type B
reorganization, decided before Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U. S. 194 (1941),
discussed infra.
32. Section 302 (b) (3), complete termination of interest, and § 302 (b) (2)-
the 80%-50% rule on "disproportionate" redemptions.
33. See note 22 supra.
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Transit Co. and B only 20% a payment of cash to B concurrently with the issu-
ance of Ack stock to A would disqualify the transaction, and even A's stock would
be subjected to capital gains tax. It is submitted that the Howard case and cases
like it reach an undesirable result. Certainly if A receives only stock, B will receive
only cash, if the continuity of interest is 80% or more; if the other requisites of
the corporate reorganization, whether Type B or Type C, are satisfied, the trans-
action should not be disqualified for reorganization treatment. The Treasury is
usually better off from the point of view of taxation of the seller (since it gets
the tax on B's sale) than it would be if nothing but stock reached Transit's share-
holders. Any unfair advantage to the buyer in the form of the use by Ack of a
high basis on Transit's books may be mitigated by the Treasury through the use
of its power against acquisitions to avoid income tax under section 269. The
partial relaxation of the "solely for voting stock" requirement in the Type C reorg-
anization (§ 368 (a) (1) (C) ) recognizes this, but does not go far enough,
since the case will be rare in which the liabilities assumed will be less than 20%
of the gross assets transferred.34
The problem may be posed because the controlling shareholders in the acquir-
ing corporation are unwilling to dilute their control, and therefore refuse to give
a sufficient number of shares directly or indirectly to all shareholders in Transit.
If a pro rata delivery of stock is accompanied by a pro rata payment of cash to
Transit, thereafter distributed to Transit shareholders, the transaction of course
fails to qualify as a reorganization, except where the statutory merger of consolida-
tion section (Type A) can be used. If the use of part cash and part stock is possible
in a statutory "merger"35 it should be possible even if a practical merger author-
ized by subparagraphs B or C of section 368 (a) (1) is effected. If both trans-
ferring and acquiring corporations are closely held the distinction between a statu-
tory and a practical merger becomes insignificant.3 6
Does it make any difference if the consideration for the surrender of B's
shares comes from someone other than Ack Corporation? In Stockton Harbor In-
dustrial Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F. 2d 638 (9th Cir. 1954), the court held
(in a stock-for-assets transaction under section 112 (g) (1) (C) of the 1939
Code) that a loan of $20,000 to the selling company by a stockholder of the buying
company which was used for the purpose of enabling the selling company to pay
certain of its fixed obligations "was not a part of what the new corporation paid
for the assets of its predecessor", and the transaction was a tax-free reorganization.
34. Section 368 (a) (2) (B).
35. See discussion in paragraphs B and C of Part IV, supra.
36. Compare the distinction between publicly held and closely held corpora-
tions suggested in the American Law Institute Income Tax Project (see Surrey &
Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute, 66 HIARv. L.
REV. 1161, 1180 (1953) and section 359 of the bill which ultimately became the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H. R. 8300, as it passed the House.
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Here it was the taxpayer who asserted that the transaction was taxable and the
Commissioner who argued successfully that the loan did not take the exchange
outside of the tax-free reorganization definition.
In the same way, in Transport Products Corporation, 25 T. C. No. 97 (Jan.
24, 1956), the court held that an obligation of shareholders of the acquiring corp-
oration to purchase from the transferring corporation or its shareholders certain
shares in the reorganized company, if demanded by the transferor corporation, did
not disqualify the transaction as a non-taxable reorganization, and as the govern-
ment urged, the taxpayer was not entitled to a higher basis for the assets acquired.
If the dissenting or departing shareholders are first paid off by Transit out of
its own cash balances, this is probably unobjectionable, so long as the continuity-of-
interest rule is satisfied. In Westfir Lumber Co., 7 T. C. 1014 (1946), the court
held that a transaction was still "solely for voting stock" and still a non-taxable
reorganization, even though the acquiring corporation had a dissenting bondholder
in the old company paid off in cash, where the evidence indicated that the sum
was paid from the account of the transferring corporation and the court considered
that the acquiring company had no cash.
Suppose that Transit at the date of the reorganization negotiation has an
insufficient cash amount or current assets for the redemption of B's stock? It will
be recalled that subsection (C) of section 368 (a) (1) permits, in a stock-for-
assets transaction, the assumption of liabilities of the transferor. Could Transit
borrow enough money to pay off B and then transfer its assets to Ack, with Ack
assuming the Transit liabilities, including the newly-incurred loan, and issuing its
stock to Transit for ultimate distribution to A as the sole remaining shareholder?
Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U. S. 194 (1942), gives consid-
erable difficulty. There, in the course of the reorganization of an insolvent com-
pany, bondholders who refused to go along with the new corporation, holding
obligations in the face amount of $440,000, were paid off in cash while the balance
of the security holders received solely voting stock. The court held37 that the cash
spoiled the tax-free character of the reorganization:
37. 315 U. S. 194, 199. This point was not necessary to the holding of the
case, since the court went on to decide-and this is the point upon which the
case is usually cited-that the issuance of warrants by the acquiring corporation,
in addition to voting stock, was sufficient in itself to disqualify the transaction
as a tax-free reorganization. On the assumption of liability issue, see the follow-
ing cases in which the assumption did not disqualify the transaction as a re-
organization: Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T. C. 399 (1949); Hoboken Land CC Improve-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F. 2d 104 (3d Cir. 1943); New Jersey Mortgage and
Title Co., 3 T. C. 1277 (1944); Cf. Central Kansas Telephone Co. v. Commissioner,
141 F. 2d 213 (10th Cir. 1944), where borrowing by the new company to pay
off nondepositing bondholders was held to disqualify the reorganization, on the
ground that "while the obligation to pay the cash had Its origin in obligations
of the old company to the nondepositing bondholders, its nature and amount were
determined and fixed in the reorganization ... "
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"That cash was raised during the reorganization on a loan from a bank.
Since that loan was assumed by respondent, it is argued that the require-
ment of Clause B [now C1, as amended in 1939, was satisfied. But in
substance the transaction was precisely the same as if respondent had
paid cash plus voting stock for the properties."
Decisions such as Stockton and Transport Products (pp. 133 and 134), svpra
may soften the influence of the Southwest Consolidated case, but at most provide
a very flexible criterion in framing the question in terms of whether the loan
effected for the purpose of buying out the minority was a "pre-existing obliga-
tion . . . determined and fixed prior to the reorganization", or a liability "deter-
nined and fixed in the reorganization". The distinction between the case where
the amount used to pay off the minority shareholders comes from the transferor
corporation in the form of cash rather than from the acquiring corporation in the
form of an offset or liability on the transferor's balance sheet is not a very satis-
factory basis of dicision. The suggestion in the Transport Products and Stockton
Harbor cases that the transaction will not be disqualified if the cash is paid or
liability incurred by controlling stockholders of the acquiring corporation, instead
of by the acquiring corporation itself, seems highly artificial, especially where the
stock in the acquiring corporation is closely held. The question should rather be
decided upon the basis of whether there is sufficient continuity of interest with
respect to the assets transferred to the acquiring corporation, and in the interests of
the remaining stockholders in the old who become stockholders in the new corpor-
ation. The major purpose of the limitation of the type of consideration in Type B
and Type C reorganizations to voting stock was to insure that continuity of inter-
est. If that question is answered satisfactorily, and it can be established that not
part of the cash paid or the liability assumed to buy out the minority inured to
the benefit of the stockholders remaining in the corporate venture, a tax-free
reorganization should be permitted.
The Treasury may have opened the windows to let in some light or the doors
to invite some trouble, as the case may be, in Revenue Ruling 55-440 (Internal
Revenue Bulletin July 5, 1955, p. 7). There the Internal Revenue Service approved
as a non-taxable organization within section 368 (a) (1) (B) of the 1954 Code a
series of transactions in which (a) the selling corporation redeemed its voting
preferred stock by giving thirty days' notice of intention to redeem, and (b) the
buying corporation acquired all of the outstanding common stock of the selling
company in exchange for its own voting common stock. The Service held the
transactions to be non-taxable even though all of the preferred stock had not been
fully redeemed; some was outstanding not only at the time the contract for the
exchange of voting shares was entered into, but at the time it was consummated.
The ruling did not consider or refer to the argument that the cash used to pay off
BUPPALO LAW REVIEM'
the preferred shareholders might be deemed to have come ultimately from the
acquiring corporation; nor did the ruling indicate whether the cash for the acqui-
sition of the preferred was derived from a loan. The precise decision was that
since the notice of redemption terminated the rights of the holders of preferred
as stockholders, the preferred stock would be disregarded in determining whether
the acquiring corporation was in control (owning 80% of all outstanding shares)
for the purposes of section 368 (c) of the Code. But RR 55-440 certainly assumes
that the redemption of the preferred stock and acquisition of the common in these
circumstances will not be considered a "one transaction" so as to disqualify the
exchange of voting stock as a non-taxable reorganization, and thus has the desirable
effect of facilitating the elimination of minority interests in stock-for-stock and
stock-for-assets transactions s
VII
TYPE D-TRANSFER OF PART OF ASSETS TO
A CONTROLLED CORPORATION
Suppose Transit stockholders desire to retain the "Surplus Building", not
needed in its foundry business, and transfer only the remaining assets to Ack?
A. This does not qualify as a reorganization, and Transit (or A and B, on
distribution) would owe a tax, based on the value of the Ack stock and property
received. The reason: neither Transit nor its shareholders end up in "control"
of Ack (§ 368 (a) (1) (D) ).
B. Could Transit transfer the business assets to a new corporation, Splinter
Company, which it or its shareholders would control?
38. The capitulation of the Treasury on the treatment of distributions In
kind provides another possible escape valve. If B will not accept the amount
of cash proposed, it may be possible to distribute to him the Surplus Building
or an interest in that building. Under prior law (Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust,
213 F. 2d 523 (1954), and Comrissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F. 2d 529 (1954) )
there was a danger that any appreciation In the value of the building would
be taxed as a dividend to B on receipt, through adding the amount of the ap-
preciation to the accumulated "earnings and profits" on the books of Transit.
The proposed Regulations attempted to follow the Hirshon and Godley cases
despite the language of the Committee Reports and the indications In the Code
to the contrary; but as a result of vociferous objections the final Regulations
limit the amount of a distribution In kind which may be treated as a dividend
to the earnings and profits of Transit, without inclusion of any unrealized ap-
preciation. See U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-1 (a) (3); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 312; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Con., 2d. Sess. 248 (1954); P-H Edition, p. 24.289 on
§ 312; cf. § 1.316-1 (a) (3) of the proposed regulations, 19 F. R. 8253.
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1. The transfer to the new corporation might be tax free under section 351,
but
2. The subsequent distribution of Splinter stock to Transit's shareholders
would not be tax free unless: (a) the transaction qualified as a spin-off, etc.
under section 355 (and met the requirement that assets transferred constitute an
"active trade or business" carried on for 5 years), or (b) the Surplus Building,
with the Splinter shares received, is handed over to A and B, with the resulting
capital gain and/or dividend tax to them.
C. The combined effect of section 368 (a) (1) (D), section 368 (a) (2)
(A) and section 354 (b) is therefore "all or nothing at all"; if Transit tries a
transfer of part of its assets, rather than "substantially all" as required in Type C,
it must either liquidate or meet the spin-off requirements of section 355.
V111
DIVIDING UP THE CORPORATION-SPLIT-UPS,
SPLIT-OFFS AND SPIN-OFFS
Assume Ack Corporation merges Transit Company through an A-type
reorganization in 1955, with all shareholders receiving voting common stock in
the new Rack, Inc. (100 to X, 35 to A and 15 to B). Then in 1957, dissension
or other factors dictate a division of the enterprise.
A. Could the foundry business be separated? Yes, provided (as of 1957):
1. This foundry, as an "active trade or business," was actively conducted
by Transit, by Rack as its successor, or by both corporations, throughout at least
a 5-year period ending on the date of distribution, and the foundry business is
continued immediately after the distribution (§ 355 (b) ).9
2. The remaining machine tool business was conducted by Rack, by its
predecessor in reorganization, or by both of them for a similar 5-year period
and is continued after the separation, and
3. The transaction is not principally a device for the distribution of earn-
39. Note that a business purchased within five years would not qualify.
Since Transit was acquired in a tax-free reorganization, you "tack on" the
time Transit actively conducted the business to the time it was actively conducted
by Rack in figuring the 5 years (§ 355 (b) (2) (D) (ii))
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ings. A subsequent sale of the distributed shares (representing the foundry
business) is not of itself determinative of this; but negotiations or an agreement
for such sale carried on before distribution are damaging (see § 355 (a) (1)
(B) and U. S. Treas. Reg. § 40 1.355-2 (B) )-shades of Court Holding!41
B. Methods of separation.
1. A Split-up-Rack transfers the foundry business to new Splinter Com-
pany, the machine tool business to new Silver Corporation, distributes Splinter
and Silver stock to A, X and B, who surrender or exchange their Rack stock; and
Rack dissolves. This was permissible as a Type D reorganization under prior
law.
2. A split-off-Rack transfers the foundry to Splinter, exchanges Splinter
stock with A, B and X for part of their Rack stock (sometimes permissible under
prior law as a Type D), with Rack continuing in business, operating the machine
tool branch.
3. A spin-off-Rack transfers the foundry to Splinter, distributes Splinter
stock to A, B and X, without exchange or surrender by the shareholders of any of
their Rack stock. Partly because the "spin-off" did not take the form of an
exchange, but a distribution, but principally because of judicial and legislative
reaction to the situation in the Gregory case, this was not permitted for many
years, despite its similarity to a split-off, until the 1951 Act added section 112
(b) (11) to the 1939 Code. But even the 1951 amendment permitted a spin-off
only through a "reorganization". It was therefore necessary under section 112 (b)
(11) that the Splinter stock be transferred to a further corporation-whose
only function would be to hold the Splinter stock, but which could qualify
as "a corporation a party to the reorganization". 42
C. Mechanics under 1954 Code:
1. If the foundry business is operated directly by Rack Corporation as a
mere division or department, it must first create a subsidiary (so that the assets
remain "locked in" a corporation) before distribution; but if the foundry is
already in a subsidiary, the stock in the subsidiary may for the first time in the
history of the corporate separation be distributed directly to the Rack share-
40. See footnote 6, supra, for source of regulations.
41. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945), the case
which highlighted the danger of the double tax on the sale and liquidation of
a corporation's assets where negotiations by the corporate officers preceded the
shareholders' sale. Section 337 largely eliminates the problem on liquidations.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 112 (g), 112 (b) (11),
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holders, without the necessity of a reorganization (§ 355 (a) (2) (C) ). All of
the subsidiary's stock must, except on the Commissioner's approval, be trans-
ferred (§ 355 (a) (1) (D)).
2. As under the 1939 Code (§122 (b) (11) ), no surrender of stock in
Rack for the Splinter shares is necessary (§ 355 (a) (2) (B) ) to qualify the
separation as tax free. But consider whether an exchange and the choice of a
split-off rather than a spin-off may not be preferable or necessary ifi these
situations:
(a) If A, B and/or X are to receive "boot" in addition to Splinter stock,
the dividend treatment of the boot, if any, may be more favorable in an exchange.
For example, if B surrenders stock in Rack for delivery to him of (i) the
Splinter shares plus (ii) $1000, the only part of the cash taxable to him is the
amount of his gain, and the only part taxable as a dividend is his ratable share
of the "earnings and profits" (earned surplus) on Rack's books or the cash
distributed to him, whichever is less, and then only if the distribution has the
"effect" of a dividend (§ 356 (a) (2) ). Since B owns 15 Rack shares out of
150 outstanding, or 10%, the maximum taxable to him as a4 dividend is $100.
But if B receives the Splinter stock and cash in a spin-off, the cash may be auto-
matically taxed as dividend (subject to the provisions of sections 301 and 316)
in the amount of $1000, if Rack's earned surplus is at least that sum, regardless
of what B's pro rata share might be (see U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.356-2 (a); Fried-
man, Divisive Corporate Reorganizations under 1954 Code, 10 TAx L. REV.
507 (1955).
(b) If "securities" in the new foundry company (Splinter) are to be
received in the separation, there must be an exchange of securities (§ 355 (a)(1) (A) (ii))
D. Could A and B be given the machine tool business and X the foundry
business by having X surrender his Rack stock, and distributing to X all of the
Splinter stock?
Yes-the continuity-of-interest rule is relaxed here; under section 355 (a)
(2) (A) distributions need not be pro rata, and under section 368 (a) (1)
(D) only "one or more" of Rack's shareholders need end up in control of
Splinter Corporation. 43
43. Caveat: Here, as under section 351 transfer on the organization of a
corporation, a disproportionate distribution of Splinter stock in some circum-
stances could conceivably mean treatment as compensation, gift, etv, (t f 5 (f) )
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E. How about spinning off the "Surplus Building"?
(1) Alone? It is probably not an "active trade or business", even if held
for rental. (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (d), Example (2) ).
(2). With the foundry business? There is the danger the Surplus Building
will be "boot," if no longer used in the business.
F. What can be "spun off":
The Regulations in effect define "active business" to exclude holding
property for investment only, and require that the segment being separated con-
stitute an existing group of activities, operated for profit and independently
producing income (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c) ). The effort of the Treasury
in the final regulations to make the definition even more stringent by requiring
the inclusion in the activities transferred of "every operation which forms a part
of, or a step in the process of earning income" is not warranted by the statute
or legislative history.44
Separations the regulations approve include: An office building partly occu-
pied, partly rented by a bank; wholesale and retail activities; a plant and business
in one state from a plant and business in another (but not if the out-of-state
plant is a new branch); and a suburban from a downtown store, where "no
common warehouse is maintained."
Disapprovals in the regulations include: Land or buildings substantially
wholly occupied and used in the business of the owner corporation (factory
building of a hat manufacturer); a research and development department (not
theretofore independently income-producing); and vacant land held by an office
building company.
What may be a serious departure of the final regulations from the expecta-
tions created by the adoption of section 355 is the refusal, in example (11) of
section 1.355-1 (d), to approve the separation of the manufacturing from the
selling activities of a corporation engaged in the processing and sale of meat
products. The comment that this is a "single integrated business" which cannot
be divided into fragments for spin-off purposes-which makes some sense-
may save some ambitious projects of divorcement.
44. The quoted phrase was not included in the proposed regulations (19
F. R. 8270). The committee Reports were concerned in this area primarily with
"not permitting the tax-free separation of an existing corporation into active
and inactive entities." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954),
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On the other hand, it would seem clear that a corporation is engaged in the
"active conduct" of more than one "trade or business" even if there are certain
selling, administrative or custodial functions or facilities used in both business
activities. There is an unjustified assumption in the example added in the final
regulations4 5 that the statute (which does not speak of "distinct" businesses)
prohibits a separation unless the business activities are independent of each other,
or unless any common operation, like a sales or office force, can be divided up
and allocated. The statement of facts in example (10), the separation of a
downtown from a suburban store, implies that if the stores used a common
warehouse a tax-free spin-off would not be permitted-presumably because the
warehouse could not be divided vertically! If the corporate separation results in
distortion of income as between the two companies, the Commissioner may still
invoke his power under section 482 to allocate gross income between affiliated
corporations to prevent tax evasion, at least until a sale is made. While the
Commissioner's success with the power of allocation has not been phenomenal,
4
,
neither that fact nor the Treasury's historical hostility to the spin-off should
result in ari arbitrary limit on the scope of section 355.
G. Preferred stock of Splinter Corporation may be distributed, and is not
"boot", but may on subsequent sale or redemption be "section 306 stock" pro-
ducing ordinary income (U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3 (b) ).
H. "Securities" distributed in excess of those surrendered are boot in the
amount of the fair market value of the excess. If the face value of the securities
received is equal to or less than face value of securities surrendered, the securities
are not "boot", regardless of market values. (§ 356 (d), following Neustadt's
Trust, 131 F. 2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942).)
I. Effect of a separation on surplus account. You must allocate earnings
and profits in ratio of the market values of the assets or businesses distributed
and retained. There can be no allocation of a deficit to Splinter Corporation
(U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10 (c) ).
That the Internal Revenue Service is still haunted by the Gregory case, and
that requests for rulings on spin-off situations may be dangerous or futile, is
indicated by a recent pronouncement, Rev. Rul. 55-103, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 31.
Translating the facts and the ruling to our case: A purchaser desired to buy the
foundry business represented by the stock in Splinter Corporation, but refused to
buy the remaining assets consisting of the machine tool business. Suppose further
45. Compare examples 10, 11 and 15 in U. S. Treas, Reg. § 1.355-1 (d).
46. See Clelsea Products, Inc., 16 T. C. 840 (1951), aff'd 197 F. 2d 620
(1952).
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that it is proposed that the stock in the subsidiary corporation, Splinter, be distrib-
uted to the stockholders of the corporation we call "Rack" in a corporate separation
under section 355 of the 1954 Code. Stating that the distribution was "merely a
device to give the ... stockholders certain assets for which the prospective pur-
chaser of their stock is unwilling to pay", the Service held that the transaction
was an arrangement for distributing the earnings and profits of the parent com-
pany, and section 355 was not available. If the negotiations for the sale had not
taken place prior to the submission of the plan of corporate separation, it is hard
to see how an unfavorable ruling could be issued without emasculating section
35547
J. Spin-offs and "thin corporations".
No doubt most lawyers are aware of the trend in recent years to organize a
corporation by having original owners receive for their capital contribution,
instead of only stock, part stock and part notes, debentures or other "debt" instru-
ments. The primary purposes of the use of debt are: (a) the interest on the notes
is deductible by the corporation, while the dividends paid on stock are not; (b)
when the corporation has acquired earnings, the debt, if true debt, may be paid
without fear of a taxable dividend to the stockholder who owns the note which is
paid, while a redemption of stock, if pro rata (or otherwise not within the excep-
tions in section 302 (b) of the Code) may result in a taxable dividend to the
stockholders whose shares are turned in. If the investment allocated to the shares
of stock is nominal only, or is small as compared to the investment allocated to
the notes or other debt instruments, the Treasury may attempt to deny the deduc-
tion of the interest on the ground that the company is a "thin corporation," and the
notes are not true debt but merely stock in disguise, so that what appears to be
interest will turn out to be dividend.
Recent decisions in this field have indicated that use of the "thin corporation"
device may have unexpected consequences.48 If the capital structure is unsuccessful
in withstanding the Treasury assault, not only will the interest paid on the "debt"
be nondeductible, and payments on the notes treated as taxable dividends, but
the conversion of the "notes" by the Treasury into "stock" may convert a high-basis
purchase into a low-basis reorganization49 - a serious consequence in this era of
continued inflation and accelerated depreciation.
47. Compare Rena B. Farr, 24 T. C. No. 38 (1955), approving a split-off of
a new building and lot where the stated purpose was to meet the requirements
of a Studebaker franchise. (1939 Code).
48. See Treusch, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments, Recent Case
Reminders of some Old Problems Under the New Code, 32 T~s 1023 (1954).
49. See Estate of Herbert B. Miller, 24 T. C. No. 103 (1955).
TAX-FREE SALE OF A BUSINESS
Even if the thin capitalization withstands attack, the top-heavy debt struc-
ture, especially if the business is held in a subsidiary, may produce serious obstacles
to a subsequent corporate separation. Paragraph (D) of section 355 (a) (1)
requires the distributing corporation in a spin-off, split-off or split-up to distribute
"all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation held by it immediately
before the distribution". If the debt instruments are in fact distributed and no
securities are surrendered in exchange, then the combined effect of sections 355
(a) (1) (D) (i) and 356 (d) is to subject the shareholder receiving the shares
and securities in the spun-off corporation to possible capital gain or dividend tax on
the principal amount of securities received.
For example, suppose Sliver Corp. is organized with a capital structure of
$20,000 in stock and $80,000 in notes, and subsequently it is decided to "spin-off"
Sliver Corp. to B. Both the stock and notes must be distributed to B to qualify
the transaction under section 355, but the result will be that the $80,000 of notes
will be taxable to B, either as capital gain or ordinary income - a consequence
which would not follow if just stock had been used in establishing Sliver's capital
structure.
The only alternative is to be prepared to satisfy the Treasury that some
shares of stock as well as securities were retained, and that the retention "was not
in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purpose the avoidance of fed-
eral income tax" § 355 (a) (1) (D) (ii) ). Oterwise the taxpayer might be
called up to urge that his company's capital structure, which he once stoutly held
to be "fat", has become "thin", and the "securities" distributed in the spin-off
were not securities at all, but "stock"!
Ix
REORGANIZATIONS INVOLVING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Since the State borders on Canada, New York Lawyers may be interested in
the application of the new provisions where, for example, Ack is a U. S. corpora-
tion, and Transit is organized under the laws of Canada. Section 367, like section
112 (i) of the 1939 Code, requires a prior ruling from the Commissioner that a
corporate reorganization or separation involving a foreign corporation does not
have tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes. Otherwise, without some form
of tax extradition, the foreign transaction might escape tax.
Suppose you have a situation in which a Canadian parent corporation (Rack)
proposed to spin-off a separate business conducted by its U. S. subsidiary (Splin-
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ter)? Here, the Commissioner has refused to rule in advance (i.e., held that no
ruling is necessary under section 367 of the Code), where the foreign company's
only role is as receiving parent or stockholder (R. R. 55-45, I.R.B. No. 5, p. 7).
The game of chess is over. And while some heads may be rolling, let us hope
none are nodding. If, despite these pages, the problems of A and B, Transit and Ack,
and Splinter and Sliver still seem complex, the fault, dear reader, is not in our-
selves, but in the interplay of the forces of corporate finance, the ingenuity of tax
planners, and the counter-measures of the watch-dogs of the Treasury. This paper
will have accomplished its purpose if, despite "spin-offs", "boot", distributions in
kind, and some of the other techniques and jargon which appear to have some
of the aspects of prestidigitation, the tax reorganization no longer seems "a sort
of hocus-pocus science".
